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Casualty Liability Company (Third-Party Defendant below and Appellant here). 
The other parties (i.e. Amy Echard Otto, Thor Y. Wixom, and Laurie Yancey) 
have not appealed the trial court's order granting State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment and denying Metropolitan Property 
& Casualty Liability Company's motion for summary judgment. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from an order of declaratory summary judgment wherein the trial court 
granted State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's ("State Farm") Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Metropolitan Property & Casualty Liability Company's 
("Metropolitan") Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court's order was entered on July 
7, 1997, and contained therein a statement that the order was a final judgment pursuant 
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 524.) 
This case has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue number 1 listed in the "Statement of Issues" section of appellant's brief is dealt 
with under points 8 and 9 below. 
Issue number 2 listed by appellant in its Statement of Issues is dealt with under 
points 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 below in appellee's brief. 
Issue number 3 listed in appellant's brief is dealt with in points 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
below in appellee's brief, particularly in point 4 below. 
Issue number 4 listed in appellant's brief is dealt by appellee State Farm in points 
1,2, 3,4, and 5. 
Issue number 5 listed in appellant's brief is dealt with in appellee State Farm's brief 
below in points 1,2,3, 4, and 5. 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes are determinative of this appeal. 
1 
Section 31A-22-302 states in pertinent part: 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies 
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security 
requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under 
Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304; 
Section 31A-22-303 states in pertinent part: 
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of 
Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor 
vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a) 
shall: 
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in 
whose name the policy was purchased, state that 
named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the 
premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of 
liability; 
(b) (i) If it is an owner's policy, 
designate by appropriate reference all 
the motor vehicles on which coverage is 
granted, insure the person named in the 
policy, insure any other person using 
any named motor vehicle with the 
express or implied permission of the 
named insured, and, except as provided 
in Subsection (7), insure any person 
included in Subsection (1)(c) against 
loss from the liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of these motor 
vehicles within the United States and 
Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest and costs, for each motor 
vehicle, in amounts not less than the 
minimum limits specified under Section 
31A-22-304;or 
(ii) if it is an operator's policy, insure 
the person named as insured against 
loss from the liability imposed upon him 
by law for damages arising out of the 
insured's use of any motor vehicle not 
owned by him, within the same territorial 
limits and with the same limits of liability 
2 
as in an owner's policy under 
Subsection (1)(b)(i); and 
(c) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure 
persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are 
residents of the named insured's household, including 
those who usually make their home in the same 
household but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same 
extent as the named insured. 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case, 
This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on or about 
October 23, 1991, at or near the intersection of 150 East Canyon Road and 2950 North, 
Provo, Utah. The accident involved an automobile driven by Thor Y. Wixom and owned 
by Laurie Yancey, and an automobile driven by Amy (Echard) Otto. (R. 1-2). At the time 
of the accident, Thor Wixom was a resident of Douglas Wixom's household; on that date, 
there was in force an automobile insurance policy issued by Metropolitan to Thor Wixom's 
father, Douglas Wixom. (R. 222-25.) Also at the time of the accident, there was in force 
a policy of insurance issued by State Farm to Amy (Echard) Otto's father, Robert A. 
Echard, which extended insured motorist coverage and benefits to Amy (Echard) Otto. (R. 
202.) 
As a result of the accident, Amy (Echard) Otto initiated a lawsuit against Thor Y. 
Wixom and State Farm. (R. 1-3.) Amy (Echard) Otto alleged that Thor Wixom was 
negligent. In addition, as to State Farm, Ms. Otto alleged that State Farm was obligated 
to pay damages incurred by her under the uninsured motorist coverage section of the State 
Farm policy based upon the allegation that Thor Wixom was uninsured at the time of the 
accident. (R. 1-3.) State Farm's answer to plaintiffs first amended complaint contained 
3 
a third-party complaint against Metropolitan, wherein State Farm asserted that the 
Metropolitan policy provided coverage for Thor Y. Wixom as it related to the subject 
accident. State Farm requested a declaratory judgment from the court against 
Metropolitan declaring that the Metropolitan policy provides coverage, (including a duty to 
defend and indemnify), for Thor Wixom, and that the uninsured motorist provisions of the 
subject State Farm policy are not applicable based upon the fact that the subject 
Metropolitan policy provides coverage. (R. 191-208.) 
B. The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court. 
As it relates to State Farm's Third-Party Complaint against Metropolitan, 
Metropolitan filed a motion for summary judgment against State Farm, and State Farm filed 
a cross motion for summary judgment against Metropolitan. (R. 321-384.) 
On July 7, 1997, the trial court judge, the Honorable Michael Glassman, granted 
State Farm's motion for summary judgment and denied Metropolitan's motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 522-525.) 
C. Statement of Facts, 
1 . On or about October 23,1991, at or near the intersection of 150 East Canyon 
Road and 2950 North, Provo, Utah, an accident allegedly occurred involving an automobile 
driven by Thor Y. Wixom and owned by Laurie Yancey, and an automobile driven by Amy 
(Echard) Otto. (R. 1-2.) 
2. At the time of the accident, Thor Wixom was a resident of Douglas Wixom's 
household; and on that date, there was in force an automobile insurance policy issued by 
Metropolitan to Douglas Wixom. (R. 222-25.) 
3. Also at the time of the accident, there was in force a policy of insurance 
4 
issued to Amy (Echard) Otto's father, Robert A. Echard wl h t^f oru IPII I, ,I i -, | n ,| ,, $t 
coverage and benefits to Amy (Echard) Otto, pursuant to the terms of the policy. (R. 202.) 
4. As a result of the accident, A m y (Fr;hriir«11 Otfi i i i i i lMtei l .1 il n ' »r 
Y. Wixom and State F a r - '^ 
5. > 11 Hi ml 11 . i nOijIiLjbnt, I I n, as to 
State Farm, she alleged that State Farm was obligated to pay damages incurred by plaintiff 
unrli M il I  in * in mi nisi II i Il iniiiMiti nil1,! IILJIJ /erdi ju ol Hie State Harm policy based upon the al legation 
that Thor Wixom was un insured at the time of the acc ident . (R. 1-3.) 
6. State Farm's answer to plaintiffs first amended complaint conta ined a th i rd-
party complaint against Metropolitan where in State r a n n c — - v 
policy provided coverage for Thor Y, W i x o m as it related to the subject accident , State 
Farm requested a declaratory judgment fro 
the Metropolitan policy provide coverage, (including a duty to de fend and indemnify,) for 
Thor Wixom, and that th f 
are not applicable based upon the fact that subject Metropol i tan policy provides coverage. 
(P i m °08 | 
In Metropolitan's answer to State Farm's third-party complaint, Metropolitan 
riumil ih.it III MIHII i II inli in ipoliidii pom y ibsueu iu uouglas Wixom provides coverage 
"pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Code relating to 11 lotor vehicle insurance." (R. 
2 0 6 , 2 2 2 - 2 5 . ) 
8. In Metropolitan's answer, Metropol i tan al leges if i its third aff irmative dr-tfpnsp 
that: 
Metropolitan alleges that there is nr no 'oivicif > i mi in U ir ils [; ilicv 
5 
for Thor Wixom's use of the vehicle owned by Laura Yancey 
because it was a non-owned vehicle available for his regular 
use. 
(R. 224.) 
9. In Metropolitan's answer they do not assert that there is no coverage under 
the policy based upon the definition of a relative. (R. 222-27.) 
10. Thor Wixom testified in his deposition that on the date of the accident, he was 
living with his family at his father, Douglas Wixom's, residence. (R. 376.) 
11. Thor Wixom had been residing at that residence for "[approximately two 
years." (R. 377.) 
12. At the time of the accident, Thor Wixom was driving a vehicle owned by 
Laura Yancey. (R. 378.) 
13. At the time of the accident, Thor Wixom had permission to drive Laura 
Yancey's car. (R. 378.) 
14. Normally, Laura Yancey would drive her car, including driving her car to and 
from BYU, where she was attending school. (R. 379.) 
15. Thor Wixom had asked Laura Yancey to borrow her car on the date of the 
accident to run some errands. He had dropped her off at school previously that day and 
was on his way to pick Laura Yancey up at BYU at the time of the accident. (R. 378.) 
16. Thor Wixom testified in his deposition that Laura Yancey normally drove her 
vehicle, including "to school and what not." (R. 380.) 
17. Thor Wixom owned his own vehicle at the time of the accident, but was not 
driving it because he was trying to sell it; he allowed the insurance to lapse about two 
weeks prior to the accident, "so I wasn't driving my own car." (R. 380-81.) 
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18. Thor Wixom, who was engaged to Laurie Yancey at the time, tpstifipi I ih, it 
: t *i\/ used Yancey's vehicle for his own personal purposes one "or maybe two times" 
"for short periods of time/' and that he did r tot \ ie-o ft> /nhk.k' "^n n rp' n ilai hnsis" stntinn:. 
Q:' (BY MR. Echard) On this particular day - let's go back 
before that. You indicated you had been insured until 
approximately two weeks before the date of the 
accident. 
A: To my recollection, yes. 
Q: So I gather, then, you had driven your car as long as 
you had insurance on it. 
A: Yes. 
Q: So it was not necessary to drive your girlfriend Laura's 
vehicle up until at least two weeks before the accident. 
A: Correct. 
Q: Do I understand you did not drive it on a regular basis, 
even from the time your insurance lapsed until the time 
of the accident? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Would you have an estimate of how many times you 
may have driven it from the time your insurance lapsed 
until the date of the accident, the approximate two week 
period of time? 
A I would probably say in that period of time I drove it 
maybe seven times for short periods of time. 
~ And would she be with you on occasions? 
f
;<r
 the time we would go places together, ! 
would drive and she would drive. 
I'm sorry? 
A. About half the time I would titw 
time she would drive. 
n
' Most of those seven times, woulu she --ave oeef 
you? 
I \Aost of them, yes. 
So you two would go somewnere Together a date or 
whatever, part of those times vou v;uld drive the 
vehicle because you were wi1,; l'^r rn ner /ehicie or 'h?/: 
occasion? 
„orrect. 
But you did not use it for your owi i personal purposes 
during those two weeks except for ti lis occasion? 
Where there any others? 
M. Yes, 1 did use the car. Well, nqam it ,is four y^ars 
7 
ago. 
Q: I understand. 
A: All I can say is the chances are, ves. I did use it another 
time or maybe two times during that two week period of 
time. 
Q: But not on a regular basis? 
A: Correct. 
(R. 329-30, 384-85, 389-91, 406.) (Underlining added.) 
19. On January 24,1997, Metropolitan filed a motion for summary judgment and 
supporting memorandum, wherein Metropolitan argued the following basis of non-
coverage: "The undisputed material facts conclusively show that Metropolitan does not 
have a duty to defend and/or identify Thor Wixom for the claim of Amy (Echard) Otto 
because she is not a 'relative' of Douglas Wixom for coverage under the Metropolitan 
policy." No other basis of non-coverage was asserted by Metropolitan in its motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 340-55.) 
20. On January 28, 1997, State Farm filed "Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Metropolitan," requesting an Order "declaring that the policy of insurance 
issued by Metropolitan provides coverage, including a duty to defend and indemnify Thor 
Wixom, as it relates to this matter and declaring that the uninsured motorist provisions of 
the subject State Farm policy are not applicable based upon the fact that the Metropolitan 
policy provides coverage." (R. 21-23.) In the memoranda filed by State Farm relating to 
these motions, State Farm argued, among other things, following points: 
(1) The Metropolitan policy provides coverage pursuant to Utah statutory law, 
and any policy provisions in conflict with Utah law are invalid; 
(2) Even assuming Utah statutory law did not invalidate the "regular use" 
exclusion, (which it does), the vehicle was not available for regular use; 
8 
(3) Metropolitan waived any right to argue ir e 
on the "regular" use issue; 
(4) The "regular use" 
(5) Even assuming that Utah statutory law did not otherwise make the language 
relatin( . -. ave 
waived its right to assert that argument; and 
(6) P n in i I! mi in! in in iiiiHL u o T i n i u u i i i if r e l a t i v e is a m b i g u o u s . 
(R. 321-39, 388-99, 4 5 8 - * ) 
21. C > hearing was held on Metropolitan's motion for summary 
judgment, and State Farm's motion for summary judgment. (R. 510 11 ) 
22. On a number of different occasions, counsel for Metropolitan admitted to the 
court during the'hearing on the motion tni .imiiii in, |iiiiiiiiiii|i in iiiii i ini 
Douglas Wixom, would have been covered under the Metropolitan policy had Douglas 
Wixorn hf^>• > '• • , | 1 1 < i'" ,| |ni• ^ ,| " 'MI/1*- ^ n h i r ^ HI inm in iip » ii i fn 11"i i d y i 11 i ii ( u d 11u"" ''''. i • om 
been the named insured. (T ranscript on Appeal, pp. 10 -1 1, attached to Appellant's Brief 
as - JSS'IOI i took place at the hearing: 
MR. DAVENPORT: . . . Undep the Metropolitan policy, it 
1
 * 'oi «Id have provided coverage for 
Douglas Wixom had Douglas Wixom 
been operating Laura [Yancey's] vehicle 
You don't dispute that? 
MR. ERICSON: A re you saying he had several vehicles 
under the policy, but had another one that 
was not -
MR. DAVENPORT: He owned it. It wasn't insured, just sittir »g 
tf iere, an antique. 
MR. ERICSON: i es 
THE COURT: So if he drove or [SIC] an antique vehicle, 
there would be coverage. 
MR. ERICSON: Apparently. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
(Transcript on Appeal p. 27, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) 
23. As another example, as it relates to a hypothetical where Douglas Wixom 
was driving the girlfriend Laurie Yancey's vehicle, the following statements were made 
during the hearing: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ERICSON: 
Let's say he never had it, and he is 
driving the girlfriend's vehicle. 
Uh-huh. 
First of all let's take the State law. You 
agree our State law would mandate the 
insurance involved here cover him? 
Yes, to the extent that-well, the policy is 
written so that it would extend to him. 
The policy in fact does. I am asking do 
you agree the State law would require it? 
It would not require it. It would allow it to 
be put in the policy if it is an owner's 
policy. Now if it is an operator's policy, 
then the State law would require it. 
. . . We have an owner, and the owner 
has a policy that covers the vehicle he 
listed. 
Correct. 
And that owner one day has a friend who 
asks him to drive her car? 
Correct. 
Because she is sick. 
Correct. 
He is driving her car. Doesn't know it is 
not insured. Gets in an accident. 
Correct. 
I would assume that his owner's policy 
would cover him driving that non-owned 
vehicle. 
As a practical matter, yes. . . . 
(Transcript on Appeal, pp. 10-12, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) 
24. At the end of the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
10 
judge expressly stated that it granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and 
| -opolitan r summary judgment for the reasons set forth by State 
Farm. Moreover, the court instructed counsel for State Farm 3 
Order was based upon the reasons argued by State r ~ ~ 
(Transcript on Appeal, p. 3 I .ittnchfrl ti 1 *A| 1  >i HI, ii M > ni if-i 1 ^ A 1 1 < h 1 i< In 1111 II 1 
25. After State Farm's counsel prepared a proposed order as instructed by the 
Judge, a copy nf si if h was SPIII I I I I IV I IMI M'!li"|vlit,in I Jfjli'ipdilaii did M . 11 object 
to the form/language of the proposed order prepared fay State Farm on the basis that the 
52(a), Utah Civil Procedure," (as Metropolitan argues in its brief). 
26. C lurt entered the following order: 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORPFR^n ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant ~ Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company's Motion iur Summary Judgment against 
Metropolitan is hereby granted for the reasons set forth in 
State Farm's Memorandum in Support of State Farm's Motion 
for Summary Judgment Against Metropolitan and Reply 
Memorandum in Support of State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Metropolitan. Among other things, in 
granting defendant State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Metropolitan, this court declares that the 
ifaject Metropolitan policy provides coverage for Thor Wixom 
as it relates to this matter, and that the uninsured motorist 
provisions of the subject State Farm policy are not applicable 
based upon the fact that the Metropolitan policy provides 
coverage. 
2 IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that Metropolitan's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is hereby denied based upon the reasons set forth in State 
Farm's Memorandum in Opposition to Metropolitan's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
3. Finally, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this court finds that there is no just reason for delay 
and expressly directs that this Order be, and the same hereby 
11 
is, a final judgment. 
(R. 523-24.) 
27. On or about July 7, 1997, Metropolitan did file a "Request for Clarification on 
Ruling on Summary Judgment," asserting that: 
It was not clear to Metropolitan if the court's ruling expressly 
contemplated the 'regular use' exclusion issue raised by the 
parties. Metropolitan therefore requests a clarification from the 
court regarding whether or not that issue was intended to be 
resolved by the court's order on the motions. If it was resolved 
by the court as argued by State Farm, Metropolitan would not 
have any objection to State Farm's proposed order. 
(R. 518-20.) 
28. In "State Farm's Opposition to Metropolitan's Request for Clarification on Ruling 
on Summary Judgment," State Farm pointed out that all the issues before the court were 
taken into consideration and ruled upon. As indicated above, the trial court expressly 
stated, among other things, that it granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and 
denied Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based upon State Farm's arguments. 
Moreover, the court expressly instructed the counsel for State Farm to put in the Order that 
the court's ruling was based upon all of State Farm's arguments. (Transcript of Appeal p. 
31, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) 
Further, the "regular use" language was expressly dealt with not only in the 
memoranda but also in oral argument. (See e.g. Transcript on Appeal, pp. 28-31, attached 
to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) Metropolitan's counsel, Carl Ericson, specifically 
refers to the exclusionary language relating to "relative" (see e.g. Transcript on Appeal pp. 
6-7) and the "regular use" exclusion (see e.g. Transcript on Appeal pp. 28-29). Mr. 
Ericson, states among other things: "First of all, on the regular use thing . . . ." (Transcript 
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on Appeal p. 28.) 
In Metropolitan's docketing statement, Metropolitan only lists four "Issues Presented 
by the Appeal." The o 
statements two through five of the statement of issues in Appellant's brie:, iiowever, the 
l i r s t h> .1 I P in M n t i f )\ il mi i I M% i il .11 n H 1 1 preserved (for appeal) in its docketing 
statement. The first issue set forth in Metropolitan's brief is as follows: "Did the trial judge 
( nn nil ip,<«p,i(i|(> n 1 1,1 in, 1 ! cig to issue a brief statement of the grounds for its decision 
as required by Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
y S U M M A R Y OF ARGUMENT 
1. Utah statutory law requires coverage*~ " * " ""'-• t 
Metropolitan can insure a resident relative to a lesser exie^ than a namea insured under 
its policy. ThorWixomw" • '-"• '^ -
been the named insured under the policy, he would have been covered However, section 
31A-22-302 pMirPss.lv rnnml iln1- Hi ml ip'-iricnt nilative-i in iiisuietJ ki llie same extent as 
the named insured, I herefore, the Metropolitan policy provides coverage. 
2 IL I I I . nl 'i li ml I I illiinivjiJ based 1 ipon the Metropolitan policy 
language which states that '•-> .-. - ^ - *• „ . .
 Kjlicy langilage. Here, the 
Mnfropi i\\Ui\ it 1  n iilif v language >. v ^ .^ates u,^\ ; its policy language is inconsistent 
with Utah iuA / * effect. Since the exclusionai y language relied 1 
,.w, there is coverage on this basis alone. 
_. The Metropolitan policy language is at the very least ambiguot is basfnl 11| II 
language referring to the statute. If Thor Wixom read the policy language stating that the 
statute governed as to coveraqp .mid then IYMII 11 u * 'IIHIIIIHI „ pi 'IMIHI II1.1I sUleb d 
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resident relative is insured to the same extent as the named insured, Thor Wixom would 
believe he was insured under the circumstances. At the very least such creates an 
ambiguity as to coverage. Since ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, the 
Metropolitan policy provides coverage on this basis also. 
4. The vehicle was not available for the "regular use" of Thor Wixom. The vehicle 
was owned by Laurie Yancey; and she used it ever single day. It was in her possession 
nearly the entire time, including the days when she attending B.Y.U. Laurie Yancey 
merely allowed Thor Wixom to use it on one or maybe two times for personal errands for 
short periods of time. Thus, Yancey's car was clearly not available for Thor Wixom's 
"regular" use. 
5. The "regular use" language in the policy is ambiguous. In fact, the Utah Court 
of Appeals has actually already addressed this same policy language in the Metropolitan 
policy. In the declaratory action Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Company, 
v. Finlavsan. 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988), this Court found that the terms "regular use" 
in the Metropolitan policy were ambiguous, therefore there was coverage. 
6. Metropolitan has waived any right to rely on the "relative" (who owns an 
automobile) exclusionary language. Metropolitan did not timely assert or argue this policy 
language, and has therefore waived any right to appropriately assert such on appeal as 
a basis for non-coverage. 
7. Metropolitan did not appeal the trial court's ruling that Metropolitan waived its 
right to rely on the "relative" exclusionary language. Therefore, this court should affirm the 
trial court on that separate basis. 
8. Metropolitan has waived any right to challenge the language of the Order 
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!ji< III ill ill mi! i SLIIP I dnn ^ motion and denying Metropolitan's motion h Metropolitan did not 
timely object to the form of the proposed order; in fact, Metropolitan, in essence, ; i| -| w\ w M 
its form. 
9. The trial court's order was otherwise ;i[i|in prinh III irnln .11*-*s lh,il ill r. based 
upon all the reasons argued by State Farm, Moreover,, even if the order did not state its 
ARGUMENT 
=? <VGE BY ME i
 ROPOLiTAN. 
In Appellant's brief, Metropolitan asserts that the Metropolitan policy is only an 
"HWI , L . h
 ti However, it is irrelevant whether the Metropolitan policy is only an 
"owner's policy" or both "an owner's" and an "operators policy" because Metropolitan is 
required to provide coverage pursuant to statute even if its policy is only an owners 
policy." 
Before discussing the particular statutory requirements, a review of a number of 
general 
requirements as to coverage under an automobile insurance policy. Utah law allows an 
ir *,- i I 'b luquift J by statute. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-303(2)(b) ('? • owever, an insurer cannot provide less coverage than 
oee e.g. chambers v. Agency Rental Car, Inc., 878 P 2d 
1164, 1167 (Utah App. 1994). To the extent a policy provision contravenes the statutory 
H-quih lenlL, Hull (jNiii||i;y piuvision has no effect in excluding coverage. See e.g. id. 
In addition, insurance contracts are liberally construed in favor of coverage. See 
e.g. Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlaysan. 751 P.2d 256, 257. Ambiguities 
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in an insurance contract will be strictly construed against the insurer. See e.g. kL Further, 
when an insurer claims there is no coverage pursuant to an exclusion, the insurer has the 
burden of proof in showing non-coverage. 
Metropolitan admits that its policy must provide the coverage mandated by Utah law. 
For example, in Metropolitan's counsel's oral arguments on the motions for summary 
judgment, he states: 
Now for the purposes of this motion, we really don't dispute that Thor was 
living at his parents' house at the time of the accident. And as such, he 
would be considered a resident of their household. Also for the purposes of 
the motion, we have no dispute that insurance companies are required to 
provide whatever statutory coverage is mandated by law. 
(Transcript on Appeal p. 3, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "1".) In addition, 
Metropolitan admits that Section 31A-22-303 of the Utah Code sets forth what is required 
in an "owner's policy." (See Transcript on Appeal pp. 4-5, attached to Appellant's Brief as 
Addendum "1".) 
Turning to the actual statutory language involved, Section 31A-22-302 states in 
part: 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to 
satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 
shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 
and31A-22-304; 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (1992). Section 31A-22-303 states in part: 
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and Part 
II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 
31 A-22-302(1)(a) shall: 
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose 
name the policy was purchased, state that named insured's 
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address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the 
policy period, and the limits of liability; 
(b) (i) If it is an owner's policy, designate by 
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on 
which coverage is granted, insure the person 
named in the policy, insure any other person 
using any named motor vehicle with the express 
or implied permission of the named insured, and, 
except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any 
person included in Subsection (1)(c) against loss 
from the liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or 
use of these motor vehicles within the United 
States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in 
amounts not less than the minimum limits 
specified under Section 31A-22-304; or 
(ii) if it is an operator's policy, insure the 
person named as insured against loss from the 
liability imposed upon him by law for damages 
arising out of the insured's use of any motor 
vehicle not owned by him, within the same 
territorial limits and with the same limits of liability 
as in an owner's policy under Subsection 
(1)(b)(i);and 
(c) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons 
related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship who are residents of the named insured's 
household, including those who usually make their home in the 
same household but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same 
extent as the named insured. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 (1988) (emphasis added). 
Thus, as it relates to an "owner's policy," the statute states that the policy "shall", 
"insure the person named in the policy " Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(b)(i) (1988). 
The person named in the Metropolitan policy is Douglas Wixom. In addition, (and as 
admitted by Metropolitan), subsection (1)(c) of this statute has an additional requirement 
relating to an owner's policy; (this additional requirement is also required in an operator's 
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policy). Subsection (1)(c) of 31A-22-303 states that the owner's policy shall " insure 
persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, . . . who are residents of the 
named insured's household,. . . to the same extent as the named insured." Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(c) (1988) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the statute requires that Metropolitan insure resident relatives of the named 
insured "to the same extent as the named insured." Here the named insured is Douglas 
Wixom. Moreover, (as the facts clearly show and as Metropolitan has already admitted), 
Thor Wixom is related to the named insured by blood (and marriage), and was a resident 
of the named insured's (Douglas Wixom) household. Therefore, pursuant to the statute, 
the Metropolitan policy has to insure Thor Wixom "to the same extent as the named 
insured [Douglas Wixom]/' 
It is clear that had Thor Wixom been the named insured (and therefore had the 
same coverage as the named insured), there would have been coverage for Thor Wixom 
under the circumstances of this case. As set forth in the statement of facts, Metropolitan 
admitted at the hearing and in memoranda that had Thor Wixom had the same coverage 
as his father and named insured, Douglas Wixom, Thor Wixom would have been covered 
by the metropolitan policy. Metropolitan's position is that Metropolitan does not have to 
provide the same coverage under its policy for a resident relative [Thor Wixom] as it does 
for the named insured [Douglas Wixom]. However, that position is directly contrary to the 
statutory language. As Metropolitan has already admitted, language in the Metropolitan 
policy that is in conflict with Utah statutory language is of no effect. 
The Metropolitan policy itself expressly states, among other things, that: 
18 
We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage 
to others for which the law holds an insured responsible 
because of an occurrence which results from the . . . use of 
. . . a non-owned automobile. We will defend the insured, at 
our expense with attorneys of our choice, against any suit or 
claim seeking these damages. 
(R. 360.) 
The policy goes on to state that "insured" means: 
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile: 
i. You; or 
ii. Any relative 
(R. 368.) 
The policy goes on to define "you" as: "'You' and ' y ° u r ' mean the person or 
persons named in the declarations of this policy as named insured and the spouse of such 
person or persons if a resident of the same household." (R. 369.) 
As the policy indicates, the named insured is "Douglas Wixom". (R. 369.) It is 
important to point out that the definition of "you" does not include any person or the spouse 
of any person who owns a private passenger automobile. (R. 369.) However, the 
definition of "relative" states: "relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage 
or adoption and who also resides in your household... . Relatives does not include any 
person or spouse of any person who owns a private passenger automobile." 
(R. 368.) 
Hence, under the Metropolitan policy, there is coverage for "you", (which is defined 
as the named insured), with respect to liability arising out of the use of an non-owned 
vehicle. Thus, named insured Douglas Wixom, (under the express language of the 
Metropolitan policy), would have been covered had Douglas Wixom been driving Laurie 
Yancey's vehicle, (instead of his son Thor Wixom). If Thor Wixom had the same coverage 
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as his named insured father Douglas Wixom, Thor Wixom would be covered by the 
Metropolitan policy. There is no exclusionary policy language which applies to the named 
insured - Douglas Wixom. The exclusionary language relied upon by Metropolitan only 
relates to "relatives," which does not (by definition) include the named insured. However, 
as discussed above, the Utah statutory language relating to "owners" policies requires that 
the Metropolitan policy "insure persons related to a named insured by blood or marriage 
. . . who are residents of the named insured's household . . . to the same extent of the 
named insured." Utah Code § 31A-22-303(1)(c) (1988) (emphasis added). Here, Douglas 
Wixom would have been insured under the Metropolitan policy if he was driving the Yancey 
vehicle. Likewise, if Thor Wixom was the named insured, he would have been covered 
under the policy language. Accordingly, pursuant to statute, the policy is required to 
provide coverage to Thor Wixom since the statute requires the resident relative to be 
insured to the same extent as the named insured. 
(Note, this argument was made by counsel for State Farm both in State Farm's 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, (see e.g. R. 465-66), and 
during the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, (see e.g. Transcript on Appeal, 
pp. 27-28).) 
Not only do we have the Utah statutory law for authority supporting coverage of Thor 
Wixom, there is also Utah case law supporting coverage under the circumstances of this 
case. See Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988). In Barber, 
(particularly the footnotes relating thereto), the court addressed the effect that the prior 
amendments to Section 31A-22-303 had on coverage, and the fact that the current 
statutory language requires that "all family members have exactly the same coverage 
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under automobile policies written in this state." Jd, at 253 n.5 (emphasis added). In 
discussing a window of non-coverage in the prior statutory scheme, the Barber court states 
in footnote four: 
4. That such a 'window' was permitted to exist is shown by recent legislation 
designed to close all such windows. Section 31A-22-303 of the new 
insurance code provides that all automobile policies issued in this state shall, 
inter alia: 
[l]nsure persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the 
named insured's household, including those who usually make 
their home in the same household but temporarily live 
elsewhere, to the same extent as the named insured. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(c) (1986) (emphasis added). 
i d at 253 n. 4 (underlining added; italics in original). Note, the Barber court emphasized 
by using italics the language in subsection 31A-22-303(1)(c) which states: "to the same 
extent as the named insured" The Barber court then went on to indicate in footnote five 
the following: 
5. Had Frank been driving the uninsured motorcycle, or even an uninsured, 
electric bus, he would have been entitled to coverage despite the policy's 
effort to exclude motorcycles and electric busses. This is so because, as he 
was named as insured, the SRA's provision that liability coverage extend to 
him when driving uninsured vehicles, including motorcycles and electric 
busses, would take precedence. The same is true for Mrs. Barber, who, as 
the insured's spouse, was defined under the policy as a named insured. Had 
Mario borrowed an uninsured car and driven it, rather than a motorcycle, into 
Mr. Bernards' car, he also would have been covered. This is so because the 
policy, although not required by the SRA to do so, protected Mario while 
driving uninsured automobiles, as opposed to vehicles of other sorts. The 
silliness of the statutory regime in effect when this accident occurred shows 
the Legislature's wisdom in now requiring that all family members have 
exactly the same coverage under automobile policies written in this state. 
See Note 4, supra. 
id. n. 5 (underlining added.). 
As the Barber court indicates in footnote five, the current statutory scheme requires 
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"that all family members have exactly the same coverage under automobile policies written 
in this state." id. (underlining added). Thus, Section 31A-22-303 requires that Thor 
Wixom have exactly the same coverage as named insured Douglas Wixom under the 
Metropolitan policy. The Metropolitan policy, as Metropolitan admits, would have provided 
coverage for Douglas Wixom, under the circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that 
the Metropolitan policy is an "owner's policy" (as asserted by Metropolitan), the 
Metropolitan policy still has to provide Thor Wixom coverage under the circumstances of 
this case. 
As indicated above, it is irrelevant as to whether the Metropolitan policy is a "owner's 
policy," or both an "owner's policy" and an "operator's policy." There is coverage for Thor 
Wixom under either case. If the Metropolitan policy is an "operator's policy", it has to 
provide coverage for Thor Wixom under the circumstances of this case; in fact, 
Metropolitan has admitted this fact. (See e.g. R. 430.) As Metropolitan admits, an 
"operator's policy" requires coverage for the named insured "arising out of the insured's 
use of any motor vehicle not owned by him," and subsection (1)(c) requires that the 
resident relative [Thor Wixom] be covered "to the same extent as the named insured [Thor 
Wixom]". Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(1998). Thus, if the Metropolitan policy was an 
"operator's policy", Douglas Wixom would be covered for liability arising out of his use of 
any motor vehicle not owned by him, as would his resident relative Thor Wixom. 
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the Metropolitan policy is solely an "owner's policy", or 
an "owner's" and "operator's" policy, since in either case coverage is required for Thor 
Wixom. 
In Metropolitan's brief, it cites Bain v. Gleason. 726 P.2d 1153, 1157-58 (Mont. 
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1986). However, the part of the Bain decision cited by Metropolitan only deals with the 
policy language, and does not deal with Utah statutory requirements. \± Bain is a 
Montana case. Bain does not address the Utah statute set forth above, or any similar 
statutes as it relates to this issue. \± Accordingly, Bain is completely irrelevant. 
In its brief, Metropolitan also cites language from Grange Ins. Ass'n v. MacKenzie. 
694 P.2d 1087 (Wash. 1985), relating to the purpose of such a provision. However, 
Grange is not on point, and does not deal with any statutory language, let alone Utah 
statutory language. (Moreover, it is ironic that Metropolitan cites this case because the 
language relating to the purpose of the exclusion (and the case in general) supports a 
finding of coverage under the Metropolitan policy.) In any event, it is the Utah statutory 
and case law cited above that governs. 
Finally, Metropoltan cites Dairyland Ins. v. State Farm Auto. Ins.. 882 P.2d 1143 
(Utah 1994); however, that case obviously deals with a completely different situation, and 
nothing in Dairyland supports in any way a reversal of the trial court's order. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BASED UPON 
THE METROPOLITAN POLICY LANGUAGE WHICH STATES THAT UTAH 
LAW GOVERNS OVER ITS OWN POLICY LANGUAGE. 
As pointed out in State Farm's memoranda, the subject Metropolitan policy states: 
CONFORMITY WITH FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
If we certify this policy under any financial responsibility law, 
this liability coverage will comply to the extent of the liability 
coverage . . . required by law. . . . 
(R. 334, 362, 396-97, 467.) 
Thus, the Metropolitan policy itself indicates that it will provide coverage as required 
by the Utah Financial Responsibility laws, despite any provisions in its policy to the 
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contrary. As discussed in point one above, the Metropolitan policy provisions relating to 
non-coverage do not conform to the financial responsibility laws of Utah and are of no 
effect. Hence, the Metropolitan policy must be read to provide coverage for Thor Wixom. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on this basis also. 
3. THE METROPOLITAN POLICY LANGUAGE, INCLUDING LANGUAGE 
RELATING TO CONFORMANCE TO UTAH LAW, IS AT THE VERY 
LEAST AMBIGUOUS. 
It is State Farm's position that the statutory law is clear and requires coverage under 
the circumstances of this case. The statutory required coverage is dispositive. However, 
the policy language itself is at the very least ambiguous. As discussed above, all 
ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, and against the insurer. As quoted above, 
the iVfetropofitan poficy expressfy indicates that it compfies with Utah faw as to liability 
coverage. (R. 362.) 
A resident relative [Thor Wixom] who reads the Metropolitan policy section quoted 
above on "Conformity With Financial Responsibility Laws," then reads Section 31A-22-303, 
(including the part which states that the resident relative is insured to the same extent as 
the named insured), and then reviews the policy and sees that the named insured [Douglas 
Wixom] is covered for the use of Laurie Yancey's vehicle under the circumstances of this 
case, would be lead to believe that he would be covered. Thus, at the very least, the policy 
itself is ambiguous as to whether or not Thor Wixom would have coverage to the same 
extent as the named insured, Douglas Wixom, (and coverage under the circumstances of 
this case). Because all ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, Thor Wixom is 
covered on this basis. Hence, the trial court's order should be affirmed. 
As a further separate basis, when all of the policy provisions are reviewed under the 
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Metropolitan policy, the Metropolitan policy language is otherwise ambiguous therefore 
mandating coverage. 
4. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE "REGULAR USE" OF 
THOR WIXOM. 
As set forth above, insurance policy provisions are strictly construed against the 
insurer. See e.g. Finlayson. 751 P.2d at 256. The interpretation of insurance contracts 
"requires liberal construction in favor o f coverage. \± Further, the insurer has the burden 
of proving the exclusion of any language is applicable. 
In its answer, Metropolitan asserts that: "There is no coverage under its policy for 
Thor Wixom's use of the vehicle owned by Laurie Yancey because it was a non-owned 
vehicle available for his regular use." (R. 224). The policy defines a non-owned 
automobile as an automobile which is not "made available for regular use." (R. 368.) 
As already discussed above, this policy provision is directly inconsistent with Utah 
statutory law and has no effect. However, as State Farm agrued in its memoranda, even 
assuming that this policy exclusion is not contrary to Utah law, (which it is), this exclusion 
does not exclude coverage under the circumstances of this case because the subject 
vehicle was not available for "regular use" to Thor Wixom. (R. 334-37, 467-69.) 
This is supported by the definition of "regular" found in Webster's New World 
Dictionary Third Edition (1980), which states that "regular" means "for general, unrestricted 
use." Here, the vehicle was not available for Thor Wixom's general, unrestricted use. The 
statement of facts set forth above show that the vehicle was owned by Laurie Yancey. In 
order to drive Yancey's car, Thor Wixom had to first obtain permission from Laurie Yancey; 
Laurie Yancey drove the vehicle on a daily and routine basis, including driving it to and 
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from BYU where she was attending school; Laurie Yancey normally drove her car on all 
occasions, including "to school and what not;" on the particular day of the accident, Thor 
Wixom asked Laurie Yancey for permission to use the vehicle that day to run some 
errands; Thor Wixom dropped Laurie Yancey off at school previously that day and was on 
his way to pick up Laurie Yancey at BYU at the time of the accident; Laurie Yancey and 
Thor Wixom were engaged at the time and would go on dates; during these dates 
sometimes Laurie Yancey would drive her car, and sometimes she would give permission 
to Thor Wixom to drive her car; the total number of times that Thor Wixom had driven the 
car was "maybe seven times" "for short periods of times;" as it relates to those seven times, 
only once or "maybe two times" had he driven the vehicle for his own purposes, and then 
it was only for "short periods of time;" and Thor Wixom "did not drive it on a regular basis." 
(R. 1-2, 378, 379, 380, 384-85.) Thus, this was Laurie Yancey's car, and she used it ever 
single day. She had it in her possession nearly the entire time, including the days when 
which she was attending school. Laurie Yancey merely allowed Thor Wixom to use it on 
one or maybe two times for personal errands for short periods of time. Thus, Yancey's car 
was clearly not available for Thor Wixom's "regular" use. 
Other cases support a finding that the vehicle was not available for "regular use." 
For example, a similar issue was addressed in Knack v. Phillips. 479 N.E. 2d 1191 (Illinois 
Ct. App. 1985), wherein the court states: 
Plaintiff basically contends that the term "regular use" 
applies a broad degree of discretion given to the driver, and if 
the discretion is restricted or limited, as plaintiff argues in the 
case here, the automobile is not available for regular use. 
Such restricted or limited use, plaintiff asserts, is present here, 
where Pamela is required to return the vehicle to Dominik 
Bombeck on the weekends and, in fact, was returning the 
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vehicle at the time of the accident, and her use during the 
week was for the main purpose of driving her car to and from 
w o r k . . . . 
We believe the availability of the Bombeck vehicle on 
the facts here are more consistent with a limited and casual 
use and not a regular use as characterized by the permission 
to use for all purposes and for a more definite period of time . 
]£L at 1192-94. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on this separate basis. 
In Metropolitan's brief, it argues under issue number "3" that the trial court 
incorrectly ruled "that there were no disputed issues of fact on the issue of whether the 
non-owned automobile driven by Defendant Wixom at the time of the accident was 
available for his regular use." First, it is disingenuous for Metropolitan to claim that there 
is a dispute as to a material fact relating hereto when Metropolitan filed its motion for 
summary judgment first, and cited the same facts (as undisputed facts) in support of its 
motion for summary judgment. (See R. 350.) In the section entitled "Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts" in Metropolitan's "Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment", Metropolitan cites from the same pages of Thor Wixom's deposition 
and expressly set forth statements relating to Thor Wixom's use of the vehicle, including 
the following statements: "Wixom was 19 years of age and residing with his parents;" 
"Yancey owned her own vehicle, a 1972 Ford LTD;" "in the two weeks between the lapse 
of insurance and the accident, he drove Yancey's vehicle approximately seven times;" 
"Yancey would have been with him during most of those seven instances in which Wixom 
drove Yancey's car;" "Wixom also used the vehicle for his own personal purposes on a few 
occasions during the two-week period;" "Wixom had permission to drive Yancey's car at 
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the time of the accident;" and "on the day of the accident, Wixom had dropped Yancey off 
at BYU, and then used her car for some errands, he was on his way back to pick up 
Yancey at BYU when the accident occurred." (R. 347-50.) These are verbatim quotes set 
forth by Metropolitan in its section of undisputed facts in its motion for summary judgment. 
Thus, Metropolitan asserted prior to the court's ruling that such facts were undisputed; 
now, after the court has ruled against Metropolitan, it is now asserting that these 
statements of fact are disputed, (although Metropolitan does not state how they are 
disputed). In summary, Metropolitan has admitted these facts, and its current assertions 
are, at the very least, disingenuous. 
Moreover, in State Farm's reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, State Farm addressed an assertion by Metropolitan in its opposing 
memorandum that they "should have the opportunity to conduct its own discovery before 
summary judgment is determined on this issue." In response to such, State Farm argued: 
In Metropolitan's opposing memorandum they also indicate that they 
"should have the opportunity to conduct its own discovery on the issue 
before summary judgment is determined on this issue." Such an assertion 
by the counsel for Metropolitan is disingenuous. First, Metropolitan has filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, which indicates that 
Metropolitan itself felt that it had conducted all of the necessary discovery. 
In addition, defense counsel mailed Metropolitan's counsel, Carl Ericson, a 
copy of the deposition of Thor Wixom on September 25, 1996. Had Mr. 
Ericson desired to further depose Mr. Wixom, Mr. Ericson could have done 
so during the four month period thereafter prior to the time that Metropolitan 
filed its motion for summary judgment. In addition, counsel for Metropolitan 
knew all along that State Farm would be filing a motion for summary 
judgment relating to these issues; in fact, this counsel has had many 
discussions with Mr. Ericson relating to this defendant's and Mr. Ericson's 
positions as to coverage. Finally, Metropolitan has not filed a Rule 56(f) 
motion along with the appropriate affidavit that "he cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition." See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f). Accordingly, plaintiffs counsel has waived any right to a 
continuance of this court's ruling on State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In any event, because the statutory language requires coverage 
under the circumstances and makes the exclusionary language relied upon 
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by Metropolitan of no effect, it is irrelevant and no continuance should be 
granted (even if a motion for such had been appropriately made). 
(R. 469.) 
In summary, Metropolitan's assertion that there are material facts in dispute is 
meritless for the following reasons: (1) there are no disputed facts relating hereto; (2) 
Metropolitan already asserted that these same facts were undisputed in its memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment, and therefore have admitted such; (3) 
Metropolitan never filed a Rule 56(f) motion seeking additional time to gather other 
evidence in an attempt to show a dispute of fact; (4) Metropolitan has not brought forth any 
evidence showing a dispute of fact; and (5) even if there was a disputed fact, which there 
is not, Utah statutory law mandates coverage in any event and makes this exclusion of no 
effect. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on these additional bases. 
5. THE "REGULAR USE" LANGUAGE IN THE METROPOLITAN POLICY IS 
AMBIGUOUS. 
Whether a policy is ambiguous is clearly a question of law. See e.g. Finlaysan. 751 
P.2d at 257-58. It is not a question of fact, i d In addition, once an ambiguity is found, it 
must "be construed in favor of coverage." id. at 258. 
As State Farm argued in its memoranda, the use of the terms "regular use" in this 
Metropolitan policy is ambiguous, requiring the extension of coverage. (R. 334-337, 467-
69.) In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has actually already addressed this same policy 
language in the Metropolitan policy. In Finlaysan. 751 P.2d 254; which was a declaratory 
action, the court found that the terms "regular use" in the Metropolitan policy were 
ambiguous, and that therefore there was coverage. In concluding, the Finlavsan court 
states: 
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As previously stated, if the words used to express the meaning 
and intention of the parties may be understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings, the language is ambiguous. We find 
either construction presented by the parties plausible. Each 
interpretation has some supporting case law, and are ordinary 
uses. For all that has been said, we find inescapable the 
conclusion that the phrase "regular use," as used in the 
Metropolitan policy, is ambiguous. The phrase must therefore 
be construed in favor of coverage for Newall Finlaysan and, 
therefore, recovery for appellant Childs. 
i d at 259.1 Thus, this Court should find coverage because of the ambiguity, and affirm the 
trial court's decision. 
Although it is irrelevant, in Metropolitan's brief, Metropolitan makes the meritless 
assertion that the two definitions for "regular use" set forth in Finlaysan are met under the 
circumstances of the case. However, although there would be coverage regardless, 
neither definition is met in this matter. One definition was referred to as a "pattern of 
usage" and defined it as "use which is consistent with a pattern or prescribed course of 
conduct or dealing." i d at 255. The other definition referred to "frequency or use," and 
defined it as frequent and continuous use, emphasizing the fact that the user had actual 
control over the vehicle (always). JdL at 256. Obviously neither definition is met in this 
case. 
In Appellant's brief, it cites Progressive N.W. Insurance v. Hoverter. 829 P.2d 783 
(Wash. App. 1992). However, Hoverter does not support there position, and is easily 
distinguished. Among other things, in Hoverter the people had their father's vehicle in their 
1
 Note, the Utah Finlaysan court opinion cited above was vacated because, (after a petition for 
re-hearing had been filed and granted), the parties entered into a settlement. Finlaysan, 751 P.2d 
437. 
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exclusive possession and could use it at any time without asking anyone permission. 
Moreover, there is already Utah law on point dealing with the actual Metropolitan language. 
6. METROPOLITAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO RELY ON THE 
EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE THAT "RELATIVE DOES NOT INCLUDE 
PERSONS" "WHO OWN A PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE." 
As discussed above, the Metropolitan policy indicates that there is coverage for 
"relatives" who drive non-owned automobiles. However, the definition of relative in the 
Metropolitan policy states in part: "Relative does not include any person . . . who owns a 
private passenger automobile." (R. 368.) 
We have discussed above in Point 1 that this exclusionary language is directly 
contrary to the Utah statutory requirements. Because the statute governs, this policy 
language is of no effect, and there is coverage under the Metropolitan policy. 
Under Point 2, we also pointed out that there is a provision in the Metropolitan policy 
which states that Metropolitan certifies that its policy complies with state financial 
responsibility laws, and to the extent it has language that does not comply, it is of no 
effect. When the statute is incorporated into and made a part of the policy (pursuant to the 
policy language referring to the statute), the policy is at the very least ambiguous. 
Moreover, the policy language is otherwise ambiguitous. 
Each of those bases in point 1 and 2, in and of themselves, support an affirmance 
of the trial court's order. 
As a separate basis, State Farm argues under this point that Metropolitan has 
waived its right to rely on this exclusionary language under the circumstances; (this 
argument was made by State Farm in its memoranda). (R. 337-38, 397-98, 468-69.) 
In Metropolitan's answer, they do not assert that this policy language relating to the 
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ownership of an automobile excludes coverage for Thor Wixom. Moreover, during the 
many years in which Metropolitan knew of this case, and was contacted about coverage, 
they had never taken the position that there was no coverage based upon this language. 
After both Metropolitan and State Farm had filed their motions for summary 
judgment, Metropolitan filed a motion to amend its answer to the third-party complaint to 
assert a defense based upon this language relating to the ownership of an automobile by 
Thor Wixom. (R. 436-444). However, as the record on appeal demonstrates, that motion 
was never granted, (and was untimely in any event). 
State Farm points out in its Memorandum in Opposition to Metropolitan's Motion to 
Amend Answer to Third-Party Complaint, Metropolitan was put on notice of the fact that 
Thor Wixom may have owned a car at the time of the accident long before Metropolitan 
filed its answer. (R. 453-56.) Further, Metropolitan's counsel was sent a copy of Thor 
Wixom's deposition, (wherein Thor Wixom pointed out that he owned another vehicle), 
many months before either party filed their motions for summary judgment. (R. 453-56.) 
Under the circumstances, Metropolitan has waived its right to assert this policy 
language as a defense to coverage under the policy. On this separate basis State Farm 
requests that the court affirm the trial court's order. 
7. METROPOLITAN DID NOT APPEAL THE COURT'S FINDING THAT 
METROPOLITAN WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO RELY ON THE "RELATIVE" 
EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE. 
State Farm argued to the trial court in its memoranda that Metropolitan had waived 
its right to rely on the "relative' exclusionary language (that there is no coverage for a 
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relative "who owns a private passenger automobile"). (See R. 337-38, 397-98, 468-69.) 
The trial court found in State Farm's favor on all grounds argued by State Farm including 
this point. Metropolitan has not appealed the trial court's finding that Metropolitan waived 
its right to rely on this 'relative" exclusionary language because Metropolitan has not 
appealed the trial court's finding on this issue and because the court's finding of this issue 
is sufficient to uphold the court's order relating thereto, this court should affirm the trial 
court's order on this separate basis alone. 
8. METROPOLITAN HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
LANGUAGE AND CONTENT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
The first issue listed in Metropolitan's brief under its "Statement of Issues" is: "Did 
the trial judge commit reversible error by failing to issue a brief statement of the grounds 
for its decision as required by Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Metropolitan has 
waived its right to raise this argument because: (1) it did not appropriately raise this issue 
at the trial court level; and (2) it did not raise this issue in its docketing statement. Either 
one of these two failures is sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute waiver of Metropolitan's 
right to appeal this issue. 
At the end of the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
expressly stated that it was denying Metropolitan's motion and granting State Farm's 
motion based upon all the reasons asserted by State Farm. State Farm was instructed 
to prepare the order. 
Counsel for State Farm prepared an appropriate order, and sent a copy of such to 
Metropolitan's counsel on July 1,1997. Pursuant to the rule 4-504(1) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, objections to proposed orders "shall be submitted to the court and 
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counsel within five days after service." See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-504(1). Here, 
Metropolitan did not file an "objection" to the form of the proposed order, and therefore 
waived any right to object to its form. 
In addition, Metropolitan did not bring a Rule 52(b) motion requesting that the court 
amend its judgment, and has thereby waived its right to do so on this separate basis. 
Utah courts have long held that an appellant's failure to file a Rule 52(b) motion precludes 
the appellant's right to raise the issue on appeal; In Alford v. The Utah League of Cities 
and Towns. 791 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah Court of Appeals addressed this 
issue.: 
Initially, Alford argues the trial court erred by failing to issue a brief 
written statement of the grounds for granting the League's motion for 
summary judgment because alternate grounds were argued by the League. 
See Utah R. Civ. F. 52(a) We agree that under rule 52(a) the trial court is 
required to make a brief written statement delineating which alternative 
theory it accepted in granting summary judgment. However, Alford failed to 
object or move the trial court to correct this oversight under Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(b). Failure to object below, in order to give a trial court an opportunity to 
cure the problem, precludes us from considering the error on appeal. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987) ("matters not raised at the 
trial court level will not be considered by [appellate court] on appeal, 
particularly when the problem could have been resolved below"); Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) (issues not presented to the trial 
court for decision are not reviewable on appeal). Therefore, we do not 
consider the trial court's failure to make the requisite rule 52(a) statement of 
the grounds for its decision on appeal. 
id. at 204. As the appellate courts indicate, this matter (and other matters) not raised at 
the trial court level will not be considered by the appellate court. Because Metropolitan did 
not appropriately raise this issue at the trial court, it cannot now be considered on appeal. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be affirmed on this separate basis also. 
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In its brief, Metropolitan refers to its filing of a "Request for Clarification on Ruling 
on Summary Judgment". In this request for clarification, Metropolitan states: 
It was not clear to Metropolitan if the court's ruling expressly contemplated 
the 'regular use' exclusion issue raised by the parties. Metropolitan therefore 
requests a clarification from the court regarding whether or not the issue was 
intended to be resolved by the court's order on the motions. If it was 
resolved by the court, as argued by State Farm. Metropolitan would not have 
any objection to State Farm's proposed order. However, if it was not within 
the contemplation of the court in granting State Farm's motion, the proposed 
order would need to be amended. 
(R. 517-19.) Nevertheless, Metropolitan agreed with the proposed order as prepared by 
State Farm, (if the issue of regular use was resolved). 
Metropolitan's claim that it was "not clear" to Metropolitan if the court's ruling 
covered the "regular use" exclusion is disingenuous. State Farm pointed this out in its 
"Opposition to Metropolitan's Request for Clarification on Summary Judgment.": 
(R. 526-529). 
As this court is well aware, this court ruled on all issues before it at the 
hearing of State Farm's and Metropolitan's motions for summary judgment. 
In fact, the court expressly stated, among other things, that it granted State 
Farm's motion for summary judgment, and denied Metropolitan's motion for 
summary judgment, for the reasons set forth in State Farm's memorandum. 
Moreover, the court expressly instructed counsel for State Farm to be put in 
the order that it was based upon the reasons set forth in State Farm's 
memorandum. 
Among other things, the regular use exclusion was expressly dealt with not 
only in the memorandum, but also at oral argument. Moreover, in granting 
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court dealt with the regular 
use exclusion issue. Among other things, State Farm pointed out both in its 
memoranda and its argument that this exclusion is directly contrary to Utah 
statute, and that Utah statute governs and requires coverage. Further, the 
Metropolitan policy itself states that Utah law governs over its own 
provisions. Moreover, State Farm pointed out that Barber v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah 1988) is directly on-point and governs the 
issue, and requires a finding of not only coverage, but that the regular use 
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exclusion does not exclude coverage. In addition, State Farm pointed out, 
among other things, that the Utah case Finlaysan. 751 P.2d 256 already 
dealt with this exact provision in the Metropolitan policy and found that this 
provision is ambiguous, and therefore did not exclude coverage. State Farm 
also pointed out in its memorandum that even if the exclusion was not 
contrary to statute, and even if it was not ambiguous, the subject vehicle was 
not available for Thor Wixom's regular use. 
In any event, this court has already ruled on all coverage issues (in this 
defendant's favor). In fact, counsel for Metropolitan, at the end of the 
hearing on these motions, requested that the court enter final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54b, recognizing that the court's ruling was dispositive of 
all coverage issues. Metropolitan's position now is directly inconsistent with 
its prior recognition at the hearing that the court had ruled on all issues. 
Metropolitan's request appears to merely be an attempt to re-argue its 
position. 
(R. 527-28). 
As it relates to the oral argument in particular, the "regular use" exclusionary 
language was specifically referred to by both counsel for State Farm and counsel for 
Metropolitan. (See e.g. Transcript on Appeal, pp. 28-29, attached to Appellant's Brief as 
Addendum " 1 " where Metropolitan states that "the regular use exclusion was not 
addressed by the parties at the hearing.) This is clearly false as a review of the hearing 
transcript clearly shows. (See e.g. Transcript on Appeal, pp. 28-29, attached to Appellant's 
Brief as Addendum "1".)) 
In any event, the Metropolitan's request for clarification was not an objection to the 
form of the order. Further, Metropolitan agreed that the form of the Order was appropriate 
(if the regular use issue had been addressed). It is clear the "regular use" issue was 
addressed. Moreover, Metropolitan did not take steps to bring its motion for clarification 
before the court to obtain a ruling on such, and thereby waived any right to appeal that 
request. 
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For the above reasons, Metropolitan has waived any right to challenge the wording 
of the Order on appeal. 
As a separate basis of waiver, Metropolitan also failed to raise this issue in its 
docketing statement. Under the section entitled, "Issues Presented by the Appeal", in the 
docketing statement, Metropolitan lists four issues. None of the four issues listed is 
whether the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to issue a brief statement on 
the grounds for its decision. Thus, Metropolitan has waived any right to appeal this issue 
on this separate basis. 
9. THE ORDER SIGNED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS OTHERWISE 
APPROPRIATE. 
Even if Metropolitan has not waived its right to challenge the wording of the trial 
court's order, (which it has), the order is otherwise appropriate. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that: "The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rule 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based upon more 
than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Here, the trial court complied with this rule. 
During the hearing, the trial court indicated that it granted State Farm's motion for 
summary judgment and denied Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based upon 
all of the arguments made by State Farm, and that such language was to be placed in the 
Order. The Order does not merely state that the trial court granted State Farm's motion 
and denied Metropolitan's motion. The order states that: "State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan is hereby 
granted for the reasons set forth in State Farm's Memorandum In Support of State Farm's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan and Reply Memorandum in Support 
of State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment against Metropolitan." (R. 523-24.) 
(Emphasis added.) The order goes on to state: [a]mong other things, in granting 
Defendant State Farm's motion for summary against Metropolitan, this court declares that 
the Metropolitan policy provides coverage for Thor Wixom as it relates to this matter, and 
that the uninsured motorist provisions of the subject State Farm policy are not applicable 
based upon the fact that the Metropolitan policy provides coverage." (R. 524.) The order 
further states: "Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied based upon 
the reasons set forth in State Farm's Memorandum in Opposition to Metropolitan's Motion 
for Summary Judgment." (R. 524.) Thus, the court did provide a written statement of the 
grounds for its order. 
Further, even if the trial court had not provided the grounds for its order, there is still 
no basis for reversal. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court states such in the case Metropolitan, 
ironically, cites in its brief. See e.g. Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 
798 (Utah 1992). While Metropolitan cited a portion of Allen in its brief, it stopped at the 
point where the court went on to indicate what the rule actually was relating thereto. After 
the language cited by Metropolitan, the court went on to state: 
Be that as it may, some trial judges cling to the view that the less explanation 
given for their rulings the better. They would prefer to remain silent and rely 
on the presumption that their rulings are correct. As we have noted, the 
wisdom of that view is questionable, but a trial judge's failure to comply with 
the last sentence of rule 52(a) alone is not reversible error absent unusual 
circumstances. See Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 
1991). We find no need to discuss in the abstract what may constitute 
unusual circumstances, but note that they are not present here. 
i d at 800-801. In Allen, the court had granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment 
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for the reasons "set forth in the arguments of defendant." Jd. At 800. Thus the Utah 
Supreme Court found that under those circumstances, it was not reversible error and did 
not constitute unusual circumstances; therefore, according to Allen, there is no basis for 
reversing the trial court's order. 
Accordingly, on this separate basis, the trial court's order should be affirmed. (Note, 
even if the trial court's order was inappropriate, and appellant had appropriately filed a Rule 
52(b) motion requesting amendment, according to Utah law reversal is still inappropriate. 
Rather, the court would merely remand it to the trial court). However, based upon the 
arguments set forth above, such is be unnecessary and inappropriate under the 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
State Farm has set forth a number of bases, each of which supports the 
affirmance of the trial court's order. State Farm requests that this court affirm the trial 
court's order based upon the reasons set forth in this brief. 
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